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MARYLAND; and CITY AND COUNTY OF 1 SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA, 2 Plaintiffs, 3 v. 4 DONALD J. TRUMP, in his official capacity 5 as President of the United States; UNITED STATES OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT 6 AND BUDGET; RUSSELL VOUGHT, in his official capacity as Director of U.S. Office of 7 Management and Budget; UNITED STATES OFFICE OF PERSONNEL 8 MANAGEMENT; CHARLES EZELL, in his official capacity as Acting Director of the U.S. 9 Office of Personnel Management; DEPARTMENT OF GOVERNMENT 10 EFFICIENCY; ELON MUSK, in his official capacity as the actual head of the Department 11 of Government Efficiency; AMY GLEASON, in her official capacity as the titular Acting 12 Administrator of the Department of Government Efficiency; UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE; 13 BROOKE ROLLINS, in her official capacity 14 as Secretary of the U.S. Department of Agriculture; UNITED STATES 15 **DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE:** HOWARD LUTNICK, in his official capacity 16 as Secretary of the U.S. Department of Commerce; UNITED STATES 17 DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE; PETE HEGSETH, in his official capacity as 18 Secretary of the U.S. Department of Defense; UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF 19 ENERGY; CHRIS WRIGHT, in his official capacity as Secretary of the U.S. Department 20 of Energy; UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND 21 HUMAN SERVICES; ROBERT F. KENNEDY JR., in his official capacity as 22 Secretary of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services; UNITED STATES 23 DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY; KRISTI NOEM, in her official 24 capacity as Secretary of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security; UNITED STATES 25 DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT; SCOTT 26 TURNER, in his official capacity as Secretary of the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban 27 Development; UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE; PAM 28 BONDI, in her official capacity as Attorney General of the U.S. Department of Justice;

1	UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE
2	INTERIOR; DOUG BURGUM, in his official capacity as Secretary of the U.S. Department
3	of the Interior; UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR; LORI
4	CHAVEZ-DEREMER, in her official capacity as Secretary of the U.S. Department of Labor;
5	UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF
	STATE; MARCO RUBIO, in his official capacity as Secretary of the U.S. Department
6	of State; UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY; SCOTT BESSENT, in his
7	official capacity as Secretary of U.S. Department of Treasury; UNITED STATES
8	DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION;
9	SEAN DUFFY, in his official capacity as Secretary for the U.S. Department of
	Transportation; UNITED STATES
10	DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS;
	DOUG COLLINS, in his official capacity as
11	Secretary of Veterans Affairs; AMERICORPS
	(a.k.a. the CORPORATION FOR
12	NATIONAL AND COMMUNITY
	SERVICE); JENNIFER BASTRESS
13	TAHMASEBI, in her official capacity as
14	Interim Agency Head of AmeriCorps; UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL
14	
15	PROTECTION AGENCY; LEE ZELDIN, in his official capacity as Administrator of U.S.
	Environmental Protection Agency; UNITED
16	STATES GENERAL SERVICES
17	ADMINISTRATION; STEPHEN EHIKIAN,
1 /	in his official capacity as Acting Administrator for U.S. General Services
10	
18	Administration; NATIONAL LABOR
10	RELATIONS BOARD; MARVIN KAPLAN,
19	in his official capacity as Chairman of the
20	National Labor Relations Board; WILLIAM
20	COWEN, in his official capacity as the Acting
2.1	General Counsel of the National Labor
21	Relations Board; NATIONAL SCIENCE
22	FOUNDATION; BRIAN STONE, in his official capacity as Acting Director of the
22	National Science Foundation; UNITED
23	STATES SMALL BUSINESS
23	ADMINISTRATION; KELLY LOEFFLER,
24	in her official capacity as Administrator of the
~ <del>~</del>	U.S. Small Business Administration; UNITED
25	STATES SOCIAL SECURITY
23	ADMINISTRATION; and LELAND
26	DUDEK, in his official capacity as Acting
20	
27	Commissioner of the U.S. Social Security
41	Administration,
28	Defendants.
۷۵ ا	Detenuants.

## Introduction

Amici file this brief in support of the motion of Plaintiffs, American Federation of Government Employees, AFL-CIO, et al., for a temporary restraining order enjoining the ongoing implementation of Executive Order No. 14210, 90 Fed. Reg. 9669 (Feb. 11, 2025). That Order exceeds the President's lawful authority by directing the restructuring of entire federal agencies, the elimination of programs and functions, and the drastic reduction of the number of employees within every agency, all without any Congressional authorization.

Plaintiffs have identified the principles embodied in the Constitution, federal statutes, and applicable decisional law that prevent the President from mandating and implementing "a critical transformation of the Federal bureaucracy" by Presidential fiat alone. In this brief, amici supplement Plaintiffs' arguments by highlighting how the President's wide-ranging Executive Order violates the carefully constructed checks and balances that are built into our Constitution. Plaintiffs' motion for a temporary restraining order should be granted.

## **Argument**

The constitutional genius of America is the establishment of checks and balances among the three branches of federal government. In discussing "the necessary partition of power among the several departments," the Framers contemplated an "interior structure of the government" that would provide "the means of keeping each other in their proper places." The Federalist No. 51 (James Madison or Alexander Hamilton). They understood that the branches' functions were not designed to be "wholly unconnected" and "should not be so far separated as to have no constitutional control over each other." The Federalist No. 48 (James Madison).

Unchecked presidential power is not what the Framers had in mind. Although the Constitution vests the President with all executive authority, it vests Congress with all legislative authority, including, significantly, the power to set fundamental policies and procedures for the executive branch. By proclaiming and implementing Executive Order 14210, the President has usurped for himself the power to restructure entire federal agencies, which can only be accomplished through the constitutionally mandated collaboration between the President and Congress.

I.

The Constitution grants Congress the authority to "make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution" not just the Article I legislative powers, but also any necessary and proper laws for "all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. Since the nation's founding, federal courts have recognized that the Constitution gives the legislative power to create, regulate, and restructure federal agencies to Congress—not to the President. *Myers v. United States*, 272 U.S. 52, 129 (1926). Congress, therefore, creates and organizes the offices and departments of the federal government by virtue of the Necessary and Proper Clause. Indeed, "among Congress's first acts were establishing executive departments and staffs . . . ." Gary Lawson, *Necessary and Proper Clause*, The Heritage Guide to the Constitution (2014). <sup>1</sup>

The President's constitutional authority, by contrast, is set forth in Article II. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1. The President has no constitutional legislative authority. *INS v. Chadha*, 462 U.S. 919, 951, 956–59 (1983); *Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer*, 343 U.S. 579, 655 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring). And none of the President's enumerated powers in the Constitution entitle the President to unilaterally initiate and carry out a massive restructuring of the executive branch. Paul Larkin & John-Michael Seibler, *The President's Reorganization Authority*, Heritage Found. Legal Memorandum No. 210, at 3 (July 12, 2017). The Constitution in turn requires that the President "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed." U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. By bypassing Congress, Executive Order 14210 is an affront to that directive.

II.

If the President disagrees with the legislative choices made by Congress—if he believes, for example, that the government is bloated, spending is out of control, or that programs and policies are poorly conceived—under our Constitutional scheme, he may recommend to Congress corrective measures that he deems "necessary and expedient." U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. The President can, for example, recommend spending rescissions and government reorganizations for

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> http://www.heritage.org/constitution/#!/articles/1/essays/59/necessary-and-proper-clause.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/files/2017-07/LM-210\_0.pdf

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Conclusion

The wisdom of the Founders in creating a system of checks and balances and the principle underlying *Youngstown* should guide the Court in its consideration of the plaintiffs' motion for a temporary restraining order. The President's actions are based in radical claims of powers that do not exist. For the foregoing reasons, *amici* respectfully support the plaintiffs' motion for a temporary restraining order.

Dated: May 8, 2025

KWUN BHANSALI LAZARUS LLP

By: /s/ Michael S. Kwun

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